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Is There a Crisis in Military Appellate
Justice?"
Eugene R. Fidell*

It is a pleasure to be with you today, not only because Dean
Logan is an old friend and former law firm colleague, but also because I have fond memories of Rhode Island, the state where my
father spent part of his childhood. Some 36 years ago I was a student at the Naval Justice School, a few miles away in Newport,
and I have never forgotten the pleasant time I spent there, early
in my career.
I.
Is there a crisis in Appellate Military Justice? At first glace
the question seems an odd one. After all, don't things seem to be
going pretty well on the appellate side of the military justice system? The highest court of the jurisdiction - The United States
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces - is turning out careful,
scholarly opinions that are easily on par with the work of the geographical circuits.
Moreover, there has been a minimum of
friendly fire among the judges; collegiality seems to be the order of
the day. Thus, the court has increasingly spoken with one voice or
at least by a lopsided majority. This means the danger of doctrinal fragility is small. This historic courthouse on E Street is in
wonderful shape. There have been no recent reversals by the Su* Remarks of Eugene R. Fidell during the Military Justice Symposium at
Roger Williams University Ralph R. Papitto School of Law, Bristol, Rhode
Island, March 31, 2006. Opinions expressed in these remarks are personal to
the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Institute of Military Justice.
** President, National Institute of Military Justice; partner, Feldesman
Tucker Leifer Fidell LLP, Washington, D.C.; Adjunct Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University.
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preme Court. Nor have there been any unanticipated departures
from the court. The court, as well as the service courts of criminal
appeals, are untouched by scandal. So, all in all, things look
pretty good.
II.
A closer look, however, presents a less rosy picture. Let me
give some examples.
Despite the current high level of interest in all things military
(including military justice and its cousin, military commissions),
the Court of Appeals continues to be an unknown institution, not
only to the American public and other federal courts, but even to
Congress.
That the court is not on the public's screen is hardly a surprise, but that it is not on the screen of the other federal courts,
after nearly 60 years of existence, is. A glance at Shepard's Military Justice Citations shows that the court's opinions - scholarly
though they often are, and dealing as they frequently do, with issues that could arise in any criminal justice system - are still only
infrequently cited outside the military appellate courts.1 This is
nothing new, 2 but the fact that it persists after so many years remains disturbing. The military itself may be a "specialized society
separate from civilian society,"'3 but that is not inevitably true of
military appellate jurisprudence. I do not believe this is healthy
or in the long-term interests of the system or the country.
Recently we were subjected to a remarkable indication of congressional disdain for the military appellate system. As you know,
Congress recently passed two important pieces of legislation concerning detainees. One - the McCain Amendment - forbade the
use of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of Department of
Defense detainees. The other - the Graham-Levin Amendment -

1. It happens from time to time. See e.g., United States v. Platte, 401
F.3d 1176, 1181-83 (10th Cir. 2005); People v. Williams, 20 A.D.3d 72, 77, 795
N.Y.S.2d 561, 566 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Anderson v. State, 385 Md. 123, 136,
867 A.2d 1040, 1047 (Md. 2005), all noted in Shepard's Military Justice Citations (Jan. 2006 Cum. Supp.).
2. See generally Eugene R. Fidell, "If a Tree Falls in the Forest...": Publication and Digesting Policies and the Potential Contribution of Military
Courts to American Law, 32 JAG J. 1 (1982).
3. E.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974).
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effectively zeroed out Guantanamo detainees' access to the district
courts for writs of habeas corpus. 4 Congress conferred on the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit judicial review authority over the military commissions and
Combatant Status Review Tribunals. This was achieved without
any hearings and on a needlessly expedited basis. So far as
known, no consideration was given to conferring that appellate
authority on the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, where at least as to the military commissions - one would have expected
it to reside, since the military commissions are criminal proceedings conducted by military lawyers and ordinarily guided by the
5
rules applicable to general courts-martial.
What is more, given the fact that the detainees and others argue that they are entitled to the trial and appellate rights afforded
to POWs because of the government's failure to conduct competent
tribunals under Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention, affording them, under Article 102, appellate review in the same court
that reviews our internal disciplinary cases - i.e., courts-martial would have been a way of honoring at least the spirit of the Geneva Convention.
Whatever other fault can be found with the DTA, Congress's
failure to confer this jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces hardly reflects a recognition of the court and its
strengths. Considering the fact that the principal author of the
Graham Amendment is an experienced military lawyer (indeed,
one who has cited his own expertise in this regard), the choice is
particularly incomprehensible - unless it is simply a reflection of
the congressional satisfaction with the seeming direction of the
District of Columbia Circuit based on its earlier decision in Ham6
dan.
4. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-163, tit. XIV, 119 Stat. 3473 (2006) ("DTA"); Department of Defense,
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf
of Mexico and Pandemic Influence Act, tit X, §§ 1001 et seq. 119 Stat. 2739
(2005) (DTA).
5. MCM preamble 2(b)(2) (2005 ed.); see generally Eugene R. Fidell,
Dwight H. Sullivan & Detlev F. Vagts, Military Commission Law, ARMY
LAWYER 47, 48-49 (Dec. 2005).
6. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2004); 126 S.Ct. 2749
(2006). The Supreme Court heard argument in Hamdan (No. 05-184) on
March 28, 2006.
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Certainly we can rule out one other possible explanation: that
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces is too burdened by its
present caseload to permit any additions. Mindful of the fact that
a good deal of the court's energy is expended on screening petitions for grant of review in the largest (discretionary) part of its
charter, the fact remains that it hands down a modest number of
full opinions. Roughly speaking, since the 2004 term, the court
has issued about one decision per judge per month. To the extent
that it continues to entertain petitions that do not cite any error,
moreover, it has only itself to blame for the size of its petition
docket. While relief is occasionally granted even though the petitioner has failed to cite any errors in seeking discretionary relief
(which is supposed to be for good cause shown), 7 this remains very
8
rare.
There have been other troublesome areas in the appellate
military justice system in recent years. For example, at least one
service court designates a single panel member to read the record
of trial. 9 Considering the unique powers of those courts to set
aside findings of guilt and reduce sentences,' 0 the "reader judge"
approach is disturbing. Equally disturbing is the fact that the
court permitted two-judge service court panels to decide cases,
even where there was no cogent reason for not filling out the bobtailed panel. "I
On a brighter note, the Court of Appeals correctly set aside
many cases in which the service court seemed to have been on
automatic pilot, simply lifting much of the issued opinion - by
means of a few keystrokes - from government briefs. 12 With luck,
at least that practice - which has already calculated to foster con-

7.

Art. 67(a)(3), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(3) (2000).

8. For a recent example see United States v. Politte, 62 M.J. 24
(C.A.A.F. Mar. 21, 2006) (3-2 decision).
9. E.g., United States v. Nelson, 52 M.J. 516 (N.M.C.C.A. 1999); United
States v. Gibson, 50 M.J. 575, 577 & n.1 (N.M.C.C.A. 1999); United States v.
Kolly, 48 M.J. 795, 796 (N.M.C.C.A. 1998).
10. Art. 66(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §866(c) (2000) (C.C.A. "may affirm only
such findings of guilt and the sentence or such part or amount of the sentence, as it finds correct in law and in fact and determines, on the basis of the
entire record, should be approved"); see United States v. Cole, 31 M.J. 270,
272 (1990); United States v. Parker, 36 M.J. 269, 271 (1993).
11. United States v. Lee, 54 M.J. 285, 286-88 (2000).
12. E.g., United States v. Jenkins, 60 M.J. 27, 29-30 (2004).
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fidence in the administration of appellate military justice - has
been forbidden. That it occurred in the first place, however, is
disquieting.
IHI.

Of all the problems currently vexing the system, the gravest,
in my opinion, is that of delay. So far, the Court of Appeals has
been unable to find a way to remedy this. Indeed, at times, the
court itself seems to take far longer to decide matters that it
ought. 13 But the real problem lies with the court of criminal appeals - mostly, but not exclusively, the United State Navy-Marine
Corps Court of Criminal Appeals.
Cases at the Navy Court have frequently seemed to fall into
an appellate black hole. The Court of Appeals has entertained a
number of extraordinary writs as a result, and has even set aside
the odd case where a particularized showing of prejudice could be
made. 14 The court has demanded explanations, 15 but when the
Navy responded that it felt the appellate division was properly
staffed, the matter seemed to lose some of its urgency. At this
writing, the Navy has made headway, but the problem of inordinate delay remains serious 16 and it is premature to conclude that
a lasting solution has been found.
Members of the service have a right to expect better. They
have a right to speedy review on appeal. 17 They have a right to
13. I can think of a case in which a peititon for review was filed before
the deadline, timely supplemented in August 2005, and briefing at the supplement (equivalent to certiorari) state was completed soon after. Seven
months later, the court still has not decided whether good cause has been
shown so as to warrant plenary briefing and argument.
14. E.g., United States v. Jones, 61 M.J. 80, 83-86 (2005) (4-1 decision)
(disapproving bad-conduct discharge).
15. Diaz v. Judge Advocate Gen. of the Navy, 59 M.J. 34, 40 (2003); see
also Diaz v. Judge Advocate Gen. of the Navy, 59 M.J. 171 (2003) (mem.).
16. As of October 2005, for example, the Navy-Marine Corps Appellate
Defense Division had 11 cases with 7-12 enlargements, 2 with 13-18
enlargements and 3 with over 19 enlargements. The numbers a year earlier
were much higher in each category. Interestingly, the defense has no monopoly on issues of delay. Timeliness can be a headache for the government as
well. E.g., United States v. Buber, 61 M.J. 72 (2005) (mem.) (4-1 decision)
(denying motion for extension of time to file certificate of review); United
States v. Harding, 61 M.J. 477 (2005) (certificate for review); United States v.
Harding, 62 M.J. 381 (specified issues).
17. E.g., Toohey v. United States, 60 M.J. 100, 100-102 (2004) (per cu-
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review at a time that can do them some good - not long after they
have completed their sentence to confinement, as happens all too
often under the current arrangements.
There are not that many measures available to address this
problem.
One is to affect a sea change on the simple matter of enlargements of time. It is certainly true that everyone involved with
military appeals has grown used to the liberal availability of
enlargements. This culture needs to change. I believe it can. I
recently met with the President and Deputy President of the Israeli Court of Military Appeals in Tel Aviv. Israel military practice requires that the accused's brief be filed within fifteen days,
and the government's response within the same period - both subject to enlargement based on a showing of need. I am sure there is
some flexibility in those deadlines, but I came away-with the sense
that appeals move along much more quickly than here.
Another remedy would be to overturn convictions or grant
sentencing relief as a sanction. Certainly there are times when
this relief can and should be granted, even without a particularized showing of prejudice. On the other hand, how likely is it that
such relief will be granted in the most serious cases, such as those
involving crimes of violence? The Court of Appeals has before it
several cases of extreme delay. We should have a clearer sense of
its approach in the next several months.
Another remedy would be for the Court of Appeals to prescribe a rigid deadline for final action by the service courts, after
which the case would be deemed affirmed and hence ripe for review by the Court of Appeals. But even if one could identify a onesize-fits-all deadline,18 cutting the courts of criminal appeals out of
the process can work a serious injustice on the accused, since
those courts have unique power over findings and sentences - a
power not shared by the Court of Appeals. (Unlike the Supreme
Court, which can grant certiorari prior to judgment in the courts

riam) (4-1 decision); Diaz, 59 M.J. at 37.
18. When it became apparent that the boards for correction of military
and naval records were taking inordinate amounts of time to decide cases,
Congress imposed timeliness standards, but did not enact a rule arbitrarily
granting relief when the standards were not met.
(2000); see also 14 U.S.C. § 425 (2000).

See 10 U.S.C. § 1557
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of appeals, 19 the Court of Appeals cannot entertain a petition for
grant of review before the service court has decided a case, 20 al21
though it does have extraordinary writ powers.)
Yet another approach would be frankly procrustean. This
would entail cutting back on the work of the service courts by
abolishing mandatory review and shifting to a right of appeal.
This would cut back on appellate delay by the simple expedient of
cutting back on the sheer number of cases.
There is a conversation to be had as to whether the military
appellate layer cake is too complicated, and whether the service
courts should be abolished. This would also be a radical change,
but it is one worth discussing - provided that at the end of the day
the accused in any court-martial gets a chance to make his or her
case on direct appeal to some court of law.
In 2003, the Navy briefly floated a proposal that would have
eliminated automatic appellate review in guilty plea general and
special courts-martial, substituting a right to appeal whenever a
finding of guilt was based, even in part, on a not guilty plea. In
cases not involving death sentences, punitive discharges, or confinement in excess of one year, the accused would be entitled to
petition for discretionary review by the court of criminal appeals.
The Army and Air Force did not support the idea and it never
emerged from the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice,
which proposes changes to the Manual for Courts-Martial and
UCMJ. 22

The next year, Jeffery D. Lippert, an Army judge advocate,
proposed eliminating automatic appellate review for all special
courts-martial, including those in which the sentence includes a
bad-conduct discharge.2 3 One of his contentions was that "reviewing special courts-martial cases under Art. 69 [i.e., administrative
review in the Office of the Judge Advocate General] saves signifi19. 28 U.S.C. § 2101(e); Sup. CT. R. 11.
20. Art. 67, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §867 (2000), e.g., United States v.
McLaughlin, 46 M.J. 159 (1996) (mem.); see also EUGENE R. FIDELL, GUIDE TO
THE RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES 17 (1 1th ed. 2003).

21.

28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000); C.A.A.F.R. 4(b).

22. I am indebted to Rear Admiral James E. McPhereson, Judge Advocate General of the Navy, for information concerning this proposal.
23. Jeffery D. Lippert, Automatic Appeal Under UCMJ Article 66: Time
for a Change, 182 MIL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004).
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cant post-trial resources because such review does not require the
preparation of verbatim records of trial. '24 He also argued that
25
courts-martial "are only infrequently set aside on appeal.
Major Lippert's proposal also rested on the notion that several
states have put in place procedures for expediting criminal cases
on appeal by screening them before a full record of trial is prepared. 26 It turns out, however, that only a handful of states do so,
and, as he notes, the First Circuit found due process flaw in one of
those states' procedure because the appellate court ruled on re27
quests for leave to appeal without an adequate record.
Whatever is done to address the problem of delay on appeal,
we should not throw out the baby with the bathwater. Every
court-martial ought to be subject to direct appellate review; the
UCMJ could usefully be amended to provide for the appeals as of
right to the Court of Appeals across-the-board. The court can
manage its caseload by ruling summarily on many cases. Dispensing with the petition states would save time and effort all
around. It would also afford GIs the same right to petition for discretionary review by the Supreme Court as other criminal defendants enjoy. The current discrepancy 28 is indefensible.
IV.
I would like to propose two other approaches to the problem of
appellate delay. One would require a major rethinking of the appellate structure; the other is much more easily done, and requires
no legislation at all.
The more radical change would be to abandon the concept
that appellate representation should be done by attorneys other
than those who defended at trial. For many years, the appellate
defense function has been centralized, in accordance with Article
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 4 & n.13; see also id. at 28-31.
Id. at 4 & n.10; see also id. at 17 & n.101
Id. at 34.
Bundy v. Wilson, 815 F.2d 125, 135 (1st Cir. 1987).

28. See Art. 67a(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 867a(a) (2000) (denial of petition
for grant of review is not reviewable on writ of certiorari); compare 28 U.S.C.
§ 1259 (3) (2000), with 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2000). H.R. 1364, 109th Cong.
(2005) (would amend § 1259 to permit petitions for certiorari where the Court
of Appeals denied an extraordinary writ, but does not correct the second sentence of Article 67a(a), which blocks direct Supreme Court review in far more
cases).
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70 of the UCMJ.29 This made eminent good sense when the military establishment was much larger and even more widely dispersed than it now is - or when communications with the field
were subject to lengthy-delays. Today, despite the current high
tempo of operations and the deployment of troops in distant
places, the fact is that the force has been downsized, permanent
bases in places such as Germany, Britain, Japan and the Philippines have been reduced or eliminated, and communications between the field and Washington are far better due, among other
things, to the Internet.
In addition, it must be recognized that there is a potentially
serious disadvantage to the accused whenever a new lawyer steps
in on appeal. Looking to trial defense counsel for the provision of
appellate representation has much to recommend it. Nothing will
be lost in translation, and the accused will at lease have had the
benefit of personal, face-to-face, contact with the judge advocate
responsible for the appeal.
It may be objected that trial defense counsel may not be as
familiar with the current state of appellate doctrine as are the
specialist appellate defense assigned to the appellate divisions
under the current arrangements. But all judge advocates go
through the same training, and all have real-time internet access
to the decision of the Court of Appeals and service courts of criminal appeals. If counsel in the field are not current on the law, they
should not be defending anyone at trial.
Similarly, it may be objected that having separate appellate
defense counsel is critical because issues of ineffective assistance
of counsel ("IAC") may be buried if appeals are handled by trial
defense counsel. This is not a compelling argument. After all,
questions of ineffective assistance of counsel can and do arise on
appeal. We thus would need an infinite regress of counsel to deal
with IAC claims. The real difficulty, it seems to me, is that the
appellate military justice system relies on the direct appellate review process to address IAC claims, rather than having them addressed on collateral attack, as the civilian federal courts and the
state courts do. The Cox Commission recognized that something
had to be done on this subject;30 to date, nothing has been done.
29. 10 U.S.C. §870 (2000).
30. Walter T. Cox III et al., Report of the Commission on the 50th Anni-
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Finally, the notion that relying on trial defense counsel to
handle appeals is unworkable disregards the practical realities.
Counsel in the filed already have to be alert to the appellate process in three ways (aside from preserving issues): they must be
ready to deal with government appeals under Article 62;31 they
must be ready to file extraordinary writs, with or without the assistance of the appellate counsel in Washington; and they must be
ready to draft Article 38(c)(1) 32 briefs setting forth issues for further review.
Nor would reliance on trial defense counsel impose an enormous or unwarranted expense on the taxpayers. The service
courts schedule very few cases for oral argument; the vast majority are decided on the briefs. Similarly, the lion's share of the
work of the Court of Appeals is conducted on paper. Only a few
dozen oral arguments are conducted each Term, and some of those
are handled in large measure by civilian defense counsel at no expense to the government. It is not an unreasonable expense to
fund travel for trial defense counsel in the remaining cases in
which the service courts or Court of Appeal hear argument. That
expense would be more than offset by the savings achieved by reducing the services' appellate divisions.
The other reform I would offer for discussion is drawing on
the civilian members of the bars of the Court of Appeals and service courts to accept appointment to represent service members on
appeal. Membership in these courts' should entail more than getting an impressive certificate on the wall. I see no reason the
military appellate courts could not direct their Clerks to develop
and maintain a list of those attorneys who are willing to accept
appointment. This would entail no expense to the government but
would give military accused and the appellate military courts the
benefit of a truly fresh, outside look at the cases. The National Institute of Military Justice suggested this in a recent case, 3 3 to no
avail. If the problem of delay has not abated - and indeed, even if
it has - the idea should be seriously considered.

versary of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 9 (2001).
31. 10 U.S.C. § 862 (2000).
32. 10 U.S.C. § 838 (c)(1) (2000).

33. See Memorandum of National Institute of Military Justice as Amicus
Curiae, Diaz, supra note 15.
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I'd like to offer two other thoughts concerning the Court of
Appeals and the military legal profession. Both points have to do
with inexorable change.
When judges or justices have sat together for a substantial
time - as was true, for example, of the Supreme Court until the
most recent vacancies occurred - the court itself, as well as the
bar, will have developed a more or less settled expectation of how
things work. Political scientists call this a "natural court. '34 Any
time the membership of a court changes, a new "natural court"
arises. Six months from today the current "natural" Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces will end. Chief Judge Gierke and
Judge Crawford will both depart.3 5 Two new judges will take
their places at or soon after the expiration of their terms of office.
Two judges constitute a big chunk of a five-judge bench; two votes
are all that is required for a grant of review. 36 The new judges -whose identities of course are unknown at this time - will likely

have a major impact on military jurisprudence during this exciting time. Presumably they will bring to the Court - and the system over which the Court presides - new perspectives. Thos who

are concerned about the administration of justice within the
Armed Forces will be hoping the new judges continue the Court's
current high standards as well as a willingness to ask, with the
Chief Judge Gierke, whether it is "time for a comprehensive reevaluation of the military justice system, '37 and to consider new
solutions to old problems.
34.

See Linda Greenhouse, Under the Microscope Longer than Most, N.Y.

TIMES, July 10, 2005, at 3; see also LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT
COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENTS 371 (3d ed. 2003) (listing

"natural" Supreme Courts since 1789).
35. That two vacancies are occurring at one time is contrary to the intent
of legislation Congress enacted in 1989, which sought to ensure staggered
terms when two new judgeships were created. Pub. L. No. 101-189, § 1301
(d)(2), 103 Stat. 1575 (1989). The fortuities of the appointment process led to
one judge receiving a shorter term than another, a discrepancy that Congress
remedied in 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 1068 (c)(1), 110 Stat. 2655 (1996).
In retrospect, it was unrealistic to hope for staggered terms, since death and
resignation could easily upset such an arrangement in any event. The 1996
legislation sacrificed the illusory benefits of staggered terms for greater stability on the Court and fairness to the judges.
36. FIDELL, supra note 20, at 42.
37. H.F. "Sparky" Gierke, C.J., C.A.A.F., Address to the ABA Mid-Year
Meeting Chicago, Embracing Change-Looking Back and Moving Forward 27
(Feb. 10, 2006).
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Finally, it is important that a new generation of leaders arise
in the military legal field to receive the baton from those of us in
my generation who have concerned ourselves with these important issues. As fewer and fewer law teacher and practitioners
have military service as part of their life experience, it will be increasingly challenging to maintain the level o knowledgeable civilian interest in military justice that I believe is critical in a democratic society. For this reason, I am particularly delighted that,
under Dean Logan's leadership, the Law School has sponsored
this important and timely symposium.

